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 THE POSSIBILITY 
OF COLLECTIVE MORAL 
OBLIGATIONS 
 Anne Schwenkenbecher 
 The philosophical literature on collective agency, collective responsibility, social epistemology, 
and social ontology is burgeoning. Scholarly interest in ‘collective’ phenomena and theories 
refl ects a persistent desire to tackle an old conundrum – the relationship between individual 
agents and the collectives they compose. The problem of reconciling these two perspectives is 
not one for philosophy alone. 1 There is a notable shift away from a strict individualism towards 
theories that refl ect the fundamentally social, cooperative nature of human activities. 
 Philosophical enquiry and theorizing has in many ways traditionally been too focused on the 
individual: the ideal of the autonomous, well- informed, moral agent has dominated ethics, phil-
osophy of action and epistemology for a long time (and arguably still does). In contrast, in pol-
itical philosophy the question of an inwardly and outwardly just society is often raised without 
spending enough time exploring what kind of ‘collective’ a society is and how to understand 
the relationship between this collective and the individuals composing it. 
 This chapter attempts to shed light on the issue of collective moral obligations, that is, 
obligations that individuals in loose groups (as opposed to group agents) may have together. 2 
I take moral obligations to be a basic feature of our moral repertoire. Put in the simplest possible 
terms, there are things we ought and things we ought not to do. 3 For instance, we ought not to 
harm others without good reason and we ought to assist those in need. Further, we might want 
to distinguish between  pro tanto and  all- out obligations.  Pro tanto obligations are demands on us 
that give us some reason to act, but which can be overridden by other, more important reasons. 
All- out obligations are those we ought to meet  all- things- considered , taking all the diff erent moral 
considerations into account. 
 My contention in this chapter is that our moral obligations ( pro tanto and  all- out ) can some-
times be collective in nature. By this I mean that moral obligations can  jointly attach to two or 
more agents in that neither agent has that obligation on their own, but they – in some sense – 
 share it or have it  in common . 4 I will explain this in more detail below. 
 I believe that the notion of collective moral obligations fi lls a conceptual gap in philosophy. 
In a sense, one could say that moral philosophy has traditionally been concerned with the 
question “what ought I  to do?,” 5 while what we ought to do as communities has been the 
focus of political philosophy. But some of the things that we  together can (and potentially ought 
to) do may be neither the political communities’ responsibility nor straightforward individual 
obligations. Furthermore, even where some desirable goal or action is  primarily the political 
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community’s responsibility, as a matter of fact, political agents (e.g. states and their institutions) 
often fall short of meeting their obligations. In either case, there may be groups of individual 
agents that can step up and produce the desired outcomes or perform the required actions. 
Examples include our joint ability to overcome collective action problems even in the absence 
of state action, such as closing (or reducing) the so- called global emissions gap (Blok, Hohne, 
van der Leun, & Harrison,  2012 ; Wynes & Nicholas,  2017 ). On a national scale, our ability to 
produce herd immunity against some infectious disease should be seen as collective. I will come 
back to these examples at the end of the chapter. My starting point will be a simpler, small- scale, 
real- world example of spontaneous collaboration between complete strangers:
 Ten passersby witness a car accident in which a motorcyclist gets trapped underneath 
a car, which has caught fi re on one side. Somebody has to act very quickly to pull 
him out the other side and in order to do so the car will need to be ever so slightly 
lifted. None of the passersby can lift the car on their own and pull the man out, but 
together they can (without taking any undue risks to their own health and safety). As 
it happened, the people manage to lift the car and save the motorcyclist’s life. 6 
 For the sake of argument, let us assume that the following is the case:  it is obvious to the 
witnesses of the accident that the man is in imminent danger and it is fairly clear what needs to 
be done to get him out of danger. 
 There are several scholars who argue that under circumstances such as these individual 
moral agents can be under a  collective obligation (or have collective responsibility) to assist (Held, 
 1970 ; Isaacs,  2011 ; May,  1992 ; Miller,  2010 ; Pinkert,  2014 ; Schwenkenbecher,  2013 ,  2014 ,  2019 ; 
Wringe,  2005 ,  2010 ,  2016 ). Collective obligations, on their accounts, are distinct from and not 
reducible to individual obligations (to contribute to cooperative ventures, for instance). 
 In the following, I will distinguish diff erent ways of spelling out such collective obligations. 
But before I do so, let me briefl y talk about why anyone might think that we need the notion 
of collective obligations. One of the starting points of many debates on collective obligations is 
the observation that in cases like the one above in order to produce the morally best outcome, 
or in order to perform the action most likely to secure that outcome, individual agents need 
to cooperate with one another and coordinate their individual actions. It takes more than one 
person’s eff ort to make a diff erence to the person in need. 
 More generally, there is a class of actions (and outcomes) that cannot be performed (or 
produced) by one person on their own. They require at least two people in order to be 
realized and no one individual agent can guarantee the success of the collective endeavor. 
These cases are characterized by ‘joint necessity.’ 7 Playing a duet is a joint necessity type of 
activity. By defi nition, it cannot be done by one person. Another example is ‘talking past one 
another.’ Joint necessity can be  analytic (as in the two examples just given), where it is part of 
what it means to do  x that  x is done by at least two people. Or joint necessity can be  circum-
stantial , where as a matter of fact (rather than as a matter of principle), something cannot be 
done by one person, for instance, if it takes two or more people to lift a heavy table (or a car, 
for that matter). 
 We can further distinguish between  strict and  wide joint necessity. 8 For strict joint necessity 
to apply, the number of available contributors to a collective outcome equals the number of 
contributors minimally necessary to produce it. What it means to be an available contributor 
would depend on the outcome in question. For the motorbike accident described above, it 
would mean anyone close enough to see what is happening and able to make some kind of con-
tribution. For strict joint necessity, the success of the joint venture is counterfactually dependent 
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on each available contributor playing their part. It is entirely within my power to stymie any 
eff orts of our duet playing and the same applies to you. 
 Wide joint necessity applies where there are more available contributors to a joint outcome 
than minimally necessary. There are many large- scale examples of wide joint necessity such 
as producing herd immunity (against a certain infectious disease), bridging the emissions gap 
(UNEP,  2017 ), or producing a referendum outcome in favor of marriage equality. In order for 
herd immunity against a particular communicable disease to be achieved it is not necessary that 
everyone who can safely be vaccinated be in fact vaccinated. Depending on the disease, the 
fi gure may be around 90 percent. What this means is that, in contrast to strict joint necessity 
cases, my unilateral defection in a wide joint necessity case does not  guarantee collective failure 
and neither does yours. This might lead someone to the conclusion that therefore individual 
obligations to contribute to such goods are always less stringent. But I think this would be the 
wrong conclusion to draw, as I shall show below. 
 In many joint necessity scenarios, something morally important is at stake. Especially 
where lives are in imminent danger, people tend to share the intuition that those who could 
help ought to do so, e.g. those witnessing the motorbike accident ought to assist the trapped 
person. But this common intuition may create a dilemma, because, no individual can guar-
antee the success of the joint endeavor (or produce the desired collective good). 9 That is, indi-
vidually, none of these passers- by can assist the trapped motorcyclist. Hence, it cannot be any 
individual agent’s obligation to rescue him. They can only help jointly. So, whose obligation 
is it? We might want to say that it is the obligation of all of them together. But what does that 
mean? Is it the ‘group’ of passers- by that has the obligation to assist? Or is there ‘merely’ an 
obligation on each of us to do our best given others’ actions? The answer is not straightfor-
ward. In my view, this impasse is regularly felt when we try to make moral decisions: it is the 
pull between the individualist option (to do something that is under one’s individual control 
only) and the collectivist option (where the success of one’s actions often depends on others’ 
contributions). 
 Scholars have chosen diff erent routes to answer the question about the locus of moral obli-
gation in joint necessity cases. Roughly, they can be divided into two groups, which I will call 
‘conservatives’ and ‘revisionists.’ Revisionist scholars will usually introduce new moral vocabu-
lary and concepts to fi ll what they believe to be a gap in traditional moral theorizing where 
joint necessity is concerned. Many argue that there is some kind of group- level obligation (or 
responsibility) that applies to loose collections of individuals such as the passersby in scenarios 
like our exemplary case (Held,  1970 ; Isaacs,  2011 ; May,  1992 ; Wringe,  2010 ). Other revisionists, 
including myself, speak of individuals holding joint obligations (Miller,  2010 ; Pinkert,  2014 ; 
Schwenkenbecher,  2013 ,  2014 ,  2019 ) or sharing obligations (Björnsson,  2014 ). Conservative 
scholars, in contrast, do not see the need for new conceptual tools, but attempt to resolve col-
lective action puzzles in a way that is maximally continuous with existing theory. They tend 
to argue that joint necessity cases give rise to (perhaps slightly more complex than usual) 
contributory duties only. According to Parfi t, for instance, each of the individual passersby 
simply has an obligation to contribute if she thinks that enough others contribute to get the 
joint endeavor off  the ground (Parfi t,  1984 ). Collins and Lawford Smith would argue that 
each ought to take steps towards forming a group that can then act as an agent (Collins,  2013 ; 
Lawford- Smith,  2015 ). 
 I will not discuss the merits of these diff erent types of approaches in any detail here, since 
I have done so elsewhere (Schwenkenbecher,  2018 ). The obvious downside of the conservative 
approach is that the obligation to produce the collective good (or to realize the joint endeavor) 
is not allocated. In our example, then, there is no obligation to free the trapped motorcyclist, 
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even though individual agents have obligations to contribute. 10 Holly Lawford- Smith acknow-
ledges this problem for the conservative approach, but bites the bullet because she thinks the 
advantages of this approach still outweigh its disadvantages ( 2015 ). In contrast, the obvious 
downside of the fi rst type of revisionist approach is this: it seems to be built on the assumption 
that there is a (novel) entity, a group agent of sorts, that can not only act on the problem at hand, 
but has a suffi  cient level of unity such that it can hold a moral obligation (or be held morally 
responsible). Revisionist scholars have tried to avoid this kind of criticism by arguing that being 
an agent is not a necessary condition for being the bearer of a moral obligation as far as groups 
(or collections of agents) are concerned (Wringe,  2010 ). 
 However, my aim here is not to give an overview of the literature but to instead fl esh out my 
own (revisionist) approach to collective obligations and show how it applies in a range of cases. 11 
This approach, while revisionist, avoids the objection sketched above by refraining from postu-
lating a group agent (even a putative or potential one) and instead conceiving of the obligations 
to assist in joint necessity cases as shared or ‘joint.’ 
 18.1  Jointly Held Obligations 
 What does it mean to say that a number of agents  jointly hold a moral obligation? On my view, 
collective obligations are not a novel type of obligation, but are moral obligations held in a col-
lective  mode : I can individually hold an obligation to do  x or we (for instance you and I) can 
jointly hold an obligation to do  x (for instance where  x is only collectively feasible). To jointly 
hold an obligation is a plural predicate – it can only meaningfully apply to two or more agents, 
very much like other (non- moral) plural predicates such as ‘playing a duet’ or ‘walking past one 
another.’ On this approach, the obligation that the passers- by in our example assist the trapped 
driver is a joint obligation; they hold it together. 
 Joint obligations give rise to further individual obligations. If you and I  jointly have an 
obligation to lift a heavy table, then each of us has an individual obligation to do our part or 
make an eff ort towards the joint endeavor. But joint obligations do not reduce to individual 
obligations to play our part. In order to see why, let us return to wide joint necessity cases, 
where we have more potential contributors then minimally necessary for the success of the 
collective performance. Suppose that it takes two people to lift a heavy table, but three poten-
tial contributors are available. Suppose further, that two is also the maximum number of people 
who can successfully lift the table together, because of the way each needs to position them-
selves to lift it. So out of the three potential contributors only two should act. It cannot be the 
case that each of the three has an obligation to act (since a three- way eff ort will not succeed). 
Neither should we think that any combination of two people (out of the three) is obligated 
to contribute. Because if we did, we would either (i) arrive at an impasse where we could not 
say exactly which two people have these obligations (that is, we would arrive at the following 
disjunctive obligation: Either  a and  b are obligated to do their part in lifting the table together, 
or  b and  c are so obligated, or  a and  c ). Or, (ii) we would have to make an arbitrary decision on 
which two people have these obligations. 
 Instead, I suggest that the joint obligation is on all three and the individual (contributory) 
obligations will be derived from it. For instance, we may all be under an obligation to see to it 
that two of us lift the table together and one of us makes sure not to interfere. In order to do 
this, we will usually have to communicate with each other. This may be non- verbal commu-
nication. In everyday life, we often coordinate our actions this way – just think of a scenario 
where some passersby rush to help someone who has trouble lifting a pram into a bus while 
others stay behind ready to step up if necessary. 
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 But we need not always be able to communicate with each other in order to acquire (and 
discharge) a collective obligation. Sometimes having the right information concerning the 
other agents’ beliefs will suffi  ce. Suppose that you and I live on opposite shores of a protected 
lake and in order to preserve the lake’s sensitive ecosystem and keep its pristine water clean we 
are instructed (by the local council) to ensure that no sewage or gray water enters the lake. We 
also learn that every neighbor is being thus instructed. Now I can do my part of not allowing 
any polluted water to enter the lake and so can you. But neither of us can guarantee that the 
lake’s water is not compromised. That outcome we can only produce together. Assuming that 
the pristine ecosystem is valuable and no overriding concerns exist, we are under an obligation 
to protect it. This obligation is held by both of us, jointly. It is not an obligation held by either 
of us, because neither can discharge it alone. Note that this does not require us to act together 
in the strict sense. Note also, that a joint plan is in place (via the local council’s communication), 
which ascribes to each of us a clearly circumscribed role in the collective eff ort (and which, 
furthermore, communicates that very fact to each of us). 
 18.2  Collectively Available Options and We- Reasoning 
 So when exactly should we think of our obligations as collective? I shall explain the conditions 
in the following. To start with, I argue that two (or more) agents have a collective moral obli-
gation to do  x if  x is an option for action that is only  collectively available and if each of them has 
suffi  cient reason to rank  x the highest out of the options available to them. 
 Let me explain what this means. In a scenario like that of the trapped motorcyclist each indi-
vidual could reason in the following way: “I can walk over and attempt to lift the car but on my 
own I will not be able to lift it. Trying to lift it will only make sense if several other bystanders 
also contribute.” 
 Naturally, most of us would probably make an attempt to get others to contribute (provided 
no countervailing circumstances obtain). But why is this so? To me it seems that the reason why 
one would try to establish collective action in this kind of scenario is because it seems like the 
(morally) best option. 
 Before I continue note two things here: I do not commit to a view on what actually  is mor-
ally best in this scenario, that is, I make my argument independently of any  particular substantive 
moral theory. Evidently, diff erent substantive theories vary signifi cantly in what they consider 
morally best. However, I am hoping that the example used here is one where the major moral 
theories and common moral intuitions converge. Further, note that calling an option ‘morally 
best’ does not imply that I am committed to some kind of consequentialism. The morally best 
option for a Kantian may be to respect someone’s autonomy and for a Virtue Ethicist it may be 
to act in the way most constitutive of  eudaimonia. 
 Returning to our individual decision- maker: Let us assume that she perceives the option as 
best where several passers- by lift the car together. It is important to note that this option is not 
actually available to  her (alone), but it is only available to  them . At the point of making her move 
to assist the trapped driver, our deliberator does not yet know exactly how many people will be 
needed and how many of the other passers- by are willing and able to contribute and who they 
are. Still, she acts on what she perceives to be the optimal option for acting in this case (jointly 
lifting the car) and she infers her own (and potentially others’) individual contributory action(s) 
from that  collectively available option. 12 
 If that is what our individual deliberator does, then she  we- reasons . This means that the 
starting point of her deliberation is not merely the options available to her (individually). 
Instead, she also includes in her deliberation those options that are only collectively available, 
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such as lifting the car and freeing the trapped motorcyclist. She reasons from the top- down, so 
to speak. Starting from the best option (which is only collectively available) she derives indi-
vidual contributory actions. 
 I am not alleging that someone who acts like our exemplary deliberator  necessarily engages 
in we- reasoning, but empirical evidence suggests that people faced with similar scenarios regu-
larly do (D. Butler,  2012 ; D. J. Butler, Burbank, & Chisholm,  2011 ). And my contention here is 
that they often should. 
 Let me now explain the idea of ‘we- reasoning’ in some more detail. The way I am using the 
term is slightly diff erent from how similar ideas of reasoning from the collective perspective are 
employed e.g. in philosophy of economics and (non- standard) game theory (Bacharach,  2006 ; 
D. Butler,  2012 ; Gold & Sugden,  2007 ; Hakli, Miller, & Tuomela,  2010 ; Sugden,  2015 ; Sugden 
& Gold,  2007 ; Tuomela,  2013 ). 13 
 Importantly, I am adopting the term from its original context of decision- theoretic discussions 
of strategic interaction for the fi eld of moral deliberation and decision- making. As moral agents, 
we regularly face problems wherein the outcome of our actions depends on how others choose. 
There are two ways of deliberating about our own choices in such cases. We can either think 
of our choices as best responses to others’ choices (I- mode reasoning). Or we can think of our 
own choices as contributions to the collectively best option (even when we do not know how 
others are (likely) to choose) (we- mode reasoning). 
 Let me illustrate this by returning to the example of the trapped motorcyclist. The individual 
passerby might reason in the following way:
 If suffi  ciently many others contribute then the morally optimal thing for me to do is 
to also contribute (provided that this will make a diff erence to the outcome). If not 
enough others contribute then the morally optimal thing for me to do is not to try to 
lift the car on my own, but perhaps to call an ambulance or the police. 
 This would be an instance of I- mode reasoning (I am adopting this term from Hakli 
et al.  2010 ). 
 Or, the individual passer- by might reason diff erently:
 The morally best outcome is the one where several people join forces to lift the car 
and free the trapped driver. In order to secure the morally best outcome, each of us 
should make an eff ort towards lifting the car. I should get others to make an eff ort in 
lifting the car and signal to others my readiness to contribute to the joint endeavor. 
 Note that this involves two steps: (i)  we- framing means to include collectively available options 
in one’s option set when deliberating about which option is best and identifying an option that 
is only collectively available as optimal. In a second step, (ii) the deliberating agent determines 
her individual course of action as playing her part in the collectively optimal course of action. 
If this is how the individual passerby reasons about what she should do, then she is employing 
we- reasoning. 14 
 There are many joint necessity scenarios where by default most of us would reason in 
this way. Not only would we include collectively available options in our deliberation (we- 
framing), but also we would take individual steps towards realizing those options as well as 
encourage others to take the necessary steps. This may (but need not) include communicating 
our intentions and goals to others, asking them to contribute, or distributing and coordinating 
tasks and roles. Often we will play our part without having information on what others are 
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doing; we will take a gamble, so to speak (for instance when we are not diverting gray water 
into the pristine lake). 
 Sometimes, individual roles or contributory tasks will be clear from the very start. This may 
be because there exists a joint plan or a habitual pattern of actions for a particular joint endeavor. 
Take the example of jointly setting a table, for instance. Or a traditional dance or a tune that 
people know well enough to perform it together instantly. 
 At other times, it may be relatively straightforward for individual agents to jointly work out 
a plan and individual contributions if they can communicate with each other. The other day 
I asked a friend to help me lift my canoe onto the roof rack of my car. We had to adjust our 
individual contributory actions on the go, but it was fairly easy to do so. If we did this more 
often, we might form a habitual pattern and could possibly even do this without important 
communicative (for instance visual) cues. 
 There are other cases where such patterns, while not habitual or engrained, can be easily 
established by potential contributors without any need for communication between them. It 
may be obvious what the collectively best choice is and how each person can contribute to 
realizing it (as, for instance, in a Hi- Lo game kind of scenario 15 ). One example would be voting 
in a referendum on a morally black and white matter, such as the right to have an abortion 
(as happened in Ireland recently) or the right of same- sex couples to marry (as happened in 
Australia recently). 
 But there are also cases where communication is diffi  cult or even impossible and where 
individual agents cannot divine their contributions to the joint task without communicating 
to the other agents. Arguably, in those cases individual agents would be less inclined to we- 
reason. That is, they may be (and probably should be) less inclined to include options that are 
only collectively available in their moral deliberation and to take steps towards realizing those 
options. 
 18.3  Joint Ability and Ignorance 
 Further, we might say that in such cases the  joint ability of potential contributors to per-
form an action or produce an outcome together is severely diminished. That is, there will be 
circumstances under which the success of joint action is so unlikely that a collection of agents 
cannot be said to have the level of joint capacity minimally required for ascribing an obligation 
to them. 
 Two agents,  a and  b , have joint ability 16 to do  x if there is at least one combination of con-
tributory actions such that 
•  these are genuine options  a and  b have, and, if both are performed in the right way, they 
produce  x ; 
•  both contributory actions are compossible; 
•  a and  b are capable of performing these actions with a view to combining them. 
 Let me explain the last condition: Joint ability is not mere compossibility. Rather, agents must – 
in principle – be able to willingly combine their actions. That is, they must be in a position to 
 intentionally perform their contributory action as a contributory action . 17 ,  18 There must be some reason 
for agents to form plural intentions in the most minimal sense as intentions the content of 
which is some collective endeavor (Ludwig,  2016 ). 19 This is important, because otherwise we 
could ascribe joint ability wherever an outcome could accidentally be jointly produced. But 
surely, the accidental production of any outcome by some agent (or group thereof) should not 
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be mistaken for a  robust ability to produce that outcome where this robust ability is the basis for 
ascribing moral obligations. 
 Joint ability, then, is highly context- dependent and particularly sensitive to shared (or even 
common) beliefs. 20 As such, joint ability can be deliberately generated in a given collection 
of agents by providing information related to collective goals and contributory actions. 21 In 
fact, public information campaigns concerning specifi c collective causes do precisely that: they 
communicate collectively desirable patterns of action and outline those individual contributory 
actions, which are most likely to produce the collective pattern. This does not only solve (or 
prevent) coordination problems, but it also generates joint ability in the sense that people may 
now reasonably form intentions concerning their contributory actions  as contributory actions 
where perhaps such intentions would not normally have been formed. Where small- scale joint 
necessity problems are concerned, we commonly (and without thinking much about it) inform 
others of the problem at hand, the potential patterns of action that will resolve it and encourage 
others to make their contribution (“Do you mind giving me a hand with this? If you just [do 
 x ] then I will [do  y ]…”). 
 In other words, knowing of possible joint initiatives to address collective action problems 
will reduce or remove  propositional ignorance of the issue concerned. A person is propositionally 
ignorant of a proposition  p if they do not know  of p (Le Morvan,  2011 ). For instance, someone 
may have never heard of anti- microbial resistance and therefore will not form intentions to 
contribute to the reduction of such resistance by changing her dietary habits, for instance 
(Giubilini, Birkl, Douglas, Savulescu, & Maslen,  2017 ). Further, information campaigns may 
reduce or eliminate  factive ignorance , that is, they may correct false beliefs on the matter at hand. 
For instance, people may believe that there is nothing we can do to stop run- away climate 
change, but we may learn that there are things we can each do that will have a signifi cant impact 
on mitigating global warming (Blok et al.,  2012 ; Dietz, Gardner, Gilligan, Stern, & Vandenbergh, 
 2009 ; Wynes & Nicholas,  2017 ). Factive ignorance, then, can also prevent agents from having 
reasons to form minimal plural intentions to perform their contributory action  as a contributory 
action . 
 It is easy to see that in our main example, the case of the trapped motorcyclist, we will 
hardly need to worry about propositional ignorance. To each of the passersby it is immediately 
obvious that the person is in need of help and that he must be pulled out from underneath the 
burning car. Where the respective (collective action) problem is less immediate (as is the case 
for problems concerning ‘distant strangers,’ for instance), propositional ignorance will become a 
major factor in collective apathy and inaction. 
 In our exemplary case, there may be some factive ignorance as to whether the random group 
of strangers is in fact capable of lifting the car and extracting the driver, but in the real- world 
case, the passers- by were confi dent enough to try. The more immediate a problem, the less likely 
it is that agents are propositionally ignorant concerning that issue. Factive ignorance, in contrast, 
can have all kinds of causes, including emotional and psychological factors, and as such is often 
diffi  cult to combat. 
 If we think that forming intentions to act depends on having certain beliefs (as I have been 
alleging) then interesting questions arise where we think that an agent or a group of agents can 
be held responsible for their suboptimal epistemic position. Take the example where a group 
of agents is factively ignorant of some harm they are collectively causing and they therefore 
continue to perform the actions that in aggregation cause harm. For instance, this was the case 
before the climate greenhouse eff ect was widely known. On my account, people who lived 
during the industrial revolution were not in fact jointly able to prevent global warming because 
their epistemic position was not such that they could have formed the intention to reduce (or 
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abstain from) their fossil- fuel burning activities as part of an eff ort to prevent global warming. 22 
This is not because there were no (feasible or economical) alternatives to burning fossil fuels 
and neither is it because they were not (accidentally or incidentally) capable of preventing the 
release of massive amounts of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, but rather because they could 
not have formed the relevant intentions to contribute to a joint eff ort to prevent aggregate 
harm, because they were ignorant of that harm. In other words, their ignorance undermined 
their joint ability. But were they responsible for that ignorance? And if so, can we say that they 
were culpable for their lack of joint ability? 
 I cannot discuss here which criteria should make us consider an agent blameworthy of her 
ignorance, but will simply point to some of the literature on this topic (Le Morvan,  2011 ; Peels, 
 2010 ,  2016 ; Rosen,  2003 ; Zimmerman,  2016 ). What we may be able to say, though, is that where 
a proposition is  public knowledge , agents will be less justifi ed in claiming ignorance. A proposition 
is public knowledge if (a) most people believe that the proposition is true and (b) most people 
believe that (a) is the case. 
 18.4  When Do We Have Collective Obligations? 
 To sum up what has been said so far: In order for two or more agents to jointly hold an obli-
gation to address some joint necessity problem they must have joint ability to address that 
problem. We also discussed that in deliberating about the right (individual) course of action vis- 
à- vis collective action problems, agents regularly we- frame the case at hand, that is, they include 
options in their deliberation that are only collectively available, and they we- reason with regard 
to their individual contributory actions. 
 It is a necessary condition for collective obligations that potential collaborators facing a joint 
necessity case have grounds to privilege we- reasoning over reasoning in I- mode. But under 
which circumstances do agents have such grounds? It is easier to give negative conditions for 
when agents lack such grounds. For instance, they will have no grounds for engaging in we- 
reasoning if they do not recognize the problem as a joint necessity case. Further, they may not 
recognize a joint necessity case as a morally pressing problem in need of resolution. Or else 
they may not be aware of other agents’ potential to contribute. Finally, they may have reason to 
believe that they are on their own with regard to the problem, because agents appear unwilling 
to contribute. However, if the problem is pressing enough, the conscientious agent must not 
give up at this point, but ought to attempt to secure the others’ cooperation. 
 The picture of joint obligations drawn here aligns best with a non- objective view of moral 
obligations. On an objective view of moral obligations, we ought to do what is objectively best 
(or right) regardless of whether we  know what that is. So even if we act conscientiously, on the 
basis of the best available information, and are rigorous in our decision- making, we may still fail 
to meet our actual moral obligations. Likewise, we may meet them accidentally. I do not have 
the space here to argue against the objective view of moral obligations and will instead refer the 
reader to Michael Zimmerman’s work on this issue ( 1996 ,  2014 ). 
 The notion of collective obligations defended here, aligns best with what Zimmerman 
( 1996 ) calls the prospective view of moral obligations. 23 To put it in a nutshell: on the pro-
spective view, we ought to do what is prospectively best, that is, what our best bet is given the 
obtainable evidence and provided we have conscientiously availed ourselves of the evidence. 
This means that our moral obligations depend on our reasonable, justifi ed (but not necessarily 
true) beliefs concerning the problem at hand. 
 The prospective view of moral obligations makes better sense of the intuition that agents 
have no collective obligation to address a joint necessity problem where they reasonably believe 
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an individually available option to be superior to an only- collectively- available option. Or 
where they reasonably disagree on which collectively available option is best and they therefore 
cannot agree on a course of action. Or where they are unlikely to fi gure out the collectively 
optimal solution in the time available to them. These kinds of complications, where they cannot 
easily be resolved between willing agents, can cancel collective obligations. 
 To illustrate the prospective view of collective obligations, let us once more return to the 
case of the trapped motorcyclist: The passers- by are likely to include the option of (collect-
ively) lifting the car and extracting the driver in their set of options for moral deliberation 
unless they have reason to believe, e.g., that there is no one available to help them. Of course, 
because the stakes are so high they may still try on their own to pull out the driver, essen-
tially testing if the option of rescuing him is individually available. However, this action is 
simply a way of availing themselves of evidence in a conscientious manner. Passersby will 
usually attempt to investigate others’ willingness to contribute – this serves to determine 
which options are available to  them 24 and, potentially, it can be the moment where individual 
roles or contributions are distributed. Further, it generates common knowledge amongst 
potential contributors, and therewith increases (or even establishes) joint ability. The same 
action can also deliver important information for each individual deliberator with regard 
to how others rank the available options and the extent to which they are willing to make 
their contribution. What they have an obligation to do will depend on what they have good 
reason to believe is the best option, given they have availed themselves of the evidence. 
That evidence will often include information about other agents’ willingness and ability to 
contribute. 
 Such information will often be crucial for whether or not the pro tanto joint obligation 
becomes an all- out obligation. To reiterate, an all- out obligation is an obligation  all- things- 
considered . Whether or not anyone (or any group) has an obligation all- things- considered 
depends on how highly a particular option for action ranks for the respective individual(s) 
amongst competing options. Or, in other words, it depends on whether the reasons that speak 
in favor of that option outweigh the reasons speaking in favor of any of the alternative options. 
Awareness of others’ likelihood to contribute will strengthen those reasons in favor of the col-
lectively available option, other things being equal. 25 
 On my view of collective moral obligations, two or more moral agents jointly hold an all- 
out obligation to perform an action or produce an outcome corresponding to a collectively 
available option if each of these agents, provided that she is conscientious, … 
 i.  … has reason to believe that the collectively available option (joint rescue) is morally best; 
 ii.  … has reason to include that option in her deliberation about her obligations (we- framing 
the problem); 
 iii.  … has reason to deduce her individual course of action based on (i) and (ii) (we- reasoning 
about the problem) and the ability to do so; 
 And if the agent … 
 iv.  … has no overriding obligations, is not unduly burdened by the task, and is jointly capable 
with the other(s) of discharging the task at hand. 26 ,  27 
 The fi rst three conditions may be met either consecutively or simultaneously. Further, we- 
framing (ii) and determining individual courses of action (iii) will usually (but not necessarily) 
mean that agents communicate amongst each other, even though this need not be verbal com-
munication. If one of the passers- by in our example observes another placing their hands on the 
car in an attempt to lift it then they usually have a reason as per (ii) and (iii). 
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 It is obvious now that our main examples came with a few implicit assumptions, which are 
responsible for the initial plausibility of the claim that the agents involved have some all- out 
duty to assist. This was necessary to get the argument off  the ground. For instance, the scenarios 
were characterized by a certain moral simplicity. The features of the situations described were 
such that rescuing the person (or protecting the lake) would presumably be the morally best 
response. That is, most major moral theories would converge in their action recommenda-
tion. Further, in taking these scenarios out of context and discussing them at a certain level 
of abstraction we simply ignored other factors that would play a role for moral deliberation. 
For instance, we did not discuss any competing obligations that our passers- by (or the lakeside 
neighbors) may have, but simply assumed that there were none that would override the obli-
gation to assist. Further, in the cases presented the objectively best option corresponded to the 
option that was perceived to be best by potential contributors (that is, the objective and the 
prospective view on obligations would align in these cases as to their action recommendation). 
Further, the joint rescue case is a one- off  problem that requires no recurring sacrifi ce. Apart 
from moral simplicity, we also assumed epistemic simplicity: the problems were fairly obvious 
to an ordinary agent and so were the solutions. The number of potential contributors was man-
ageable and they could communicate directly with one another. Naturally, more often than 
not these favorable conditions will not obtain. What impact do moral and epistemic uncer-
tainty have on our collective obligations? The short answer is:  the same impact as they have 
on our individual obligations. We frequently make decisions about what we ought to do under 
conditions of uncertainty and risk. As such, assumptions concerning which of our many pro 
tanto obligations become all- out obligations will always be somewhat approximate. 
 However, it may seem that  more needs to be known or possibly investigated by individual 
agents if they are to jointly hold an obligation, compared to individually held obligations. This 
is true insofar as some knowledge concerning the others’ willingness and ability to contribute 
to a joint endeavor are concerned. On the other hand, joint agency often calls for the sharing of 
(epistemic and other) expertise and burdens. Often, we do not  each need to know how exactly 
to address some problem in order to jointly address it, as long as between us we have enough 
expertise to do so. In this regard, the threshold to acquiring collective obligations may in fact be 
lower than it is for individual obligations, or, put diff erently, the former may at times be more 
easily defeated than the latter. 
 18.5  Large- scale and Global Moral Obligations 
 Let me conclude by commenting on a controversial question, that has been receiving some 
attention in the literature:  the problem of large- scale and even global collective obligations 
(Isaacs,  2011 ; Lawford- Smith,  2015 ; Schlothfeldt,  2009 ; Schwenkenbecher,  2013 ,  2017 ; Wringe, 
 2005 ,  2010 ). In the examples used above, I suggested that we may have collective obligations 
to mitigate climate change through aggregate emission reductions. But is this really so? Can 
we – meaning ‘humanity,’ or the ‘global rich,’ or ‘citizens of industrialized nations’ – really have 
collective obligations to resolve such problems? That is, can individuals forming part of large, 
dispersed, non- organized groups, have collective obligations to jointly bring about some out-
come or perform some action? 28 
 One of the challenges of making defi nitive claims about ‘global moral obligations’ is that 
the problems these obligations are supposedly meant to address are usually extremely complex, 
unlike the fairly simple cases discussed above. This increase in epistemic complexity brings with 
it a certain ambiguity and vagueness in the ascription of obligations and responsibilities, not just 
in the collective case, but for individual duties, too. 
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 Having said that, we might say that  some large- scale collective action problems really are  not 
too complex to be addressed by large and dispersed groups with no signifi cant level of organ-
ization if they are in a position to produce desirable outcomes by way of aggregating individual 
actions or their eff ects. 
 Here is one example: Herd immunity against some disease  – that is, the absence of the 
pathogen causing it – is a public good that is only produced if in a given population the vac-
cination rate is above a certain minimum threshold. Where herd immunity is undermined by 
lower- than- necessary vaccination rates, those who cannot be vaccinated because they are too 
young, too old, or ill, are at risk of contracting the respective disease, which – in the worst case – 
may lead to death. Protecting these vulnerable groups from the respective disease is only collect-
ively possible: a suffi  ciently high percentage of people in that population must be vaccinated. 
Here it seems easy to stipulate a collective obligation, at least for those groups to whom these 
causal links are known. Again, public information campaigns can further increase public know-
ledge of the interrelation of vaccination behavior and deaths from these often- archaic diseases. 
The collectively optimal pattern of action and individual contributory actions are obvious and 
they are generally not too costly. 
 Let me now return to the problem of climate change mitigation. Do we have collective 
obligations to address this problem through the combined eff ect of individual action choices? 
Clearly, climate change mitigation is much more complex a goal than herd immunity, for 
instance. Let me therefore make a conditional claim: If climate scientists are correct in assuming 
that aggregate individual behavioral changes can have a signifi cant if not decisive impact on 
closing the global emissions gap 29 (Blok et al.,  2012 ; Wynes & Nicholas,  2017 ) then I see no 
reason why we (capable citizens around the world 30 ) should not in principle have an obligation 
to make those behavioral changes with a view to contributing to large- scale collective action on 
climate change. However, I believe that public knowledge concerning the gap and the measures 
to reduce it is currently insuffi  cient for grounding an all- out collective obligation to reduce or 
eliminate the emissions gap. 
 The crucial role that direct interaction and communication play in coordinating spontan-
eous collective endeavors (such as the joint rescue of an injured motorist) and establishing the 
epistemic conditions for we- framing (and agency transformation) can potentially be fulfi lled 
by other means, such as public information campaigns, blogs, social media, etc. when it comes 
to large- scale collective action. However, the latter will usually require greater levels of organ-
ization and leadership and where these are absent we may lack the prerequisites for holding 
collective moral obligations to address these issues. 
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 Notes 
  1  To give just three examples from outside philosophy: Behavioural economists like Michael Bacharach 
emphasize the importance of ‘team reasoning’ in strategic interaction, and evolutionary biologist 
Michael Tomasello posits the adaptive advantage from ‘collective intentionality’ in our ancestors’ 
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thinking ((2006) (2014)) Olson, M. (1971).  The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
  2  I am referring to group agents as described by List and Pettit (2011) or Tollefsen ( 2015 ). 
  3  I cannot say much more about this without abandoning the required level of generality. How moral 
obligations as such are grounded is a question that cannot be addressed here. In particular, I will refrain 
from committing to any ‘substantive’ moral theory. 
  4  To jointly have an obligation is a plural moral predicate, much like to play a duet is a plural non- moral 
predicate. 
  5  Exceptions include Donald Regan’s and Derek Parfi t’s works (Parfi t,  1984 ; Regan,  1980 ). 
  6  See  www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/ worldnews/ northamerica/ usa/ 8761446/ Trapped- motorcyclist- saved- 
by- bystanders- who- lifted- burning- car.html . There are countless other examples of strangers collabor-
ating spontaneously to save the life of perfect strangers or to protect them from harm. See for instance 
 www.abc.net.au/ news/ 2014- 08- 06/ man- freed- after- leg- trapped- in- gap- on- perth- train- station/ 
5652486 (both accessed July 7, 2018). I have used structurally similar examples in Schwenkenbecher 
 2013 ,  2014 , and  2019 , and so have a number of other scholars, such as Collins  2013 and Wringe  2016 . 
  7  I am adopting this term from Lawford- Smith (2012). 
  8  I fi rst introduced this distinction in Schwenkenbecher ( 2017 ). 
  9  Another problem may arise if this turns out to be a wide joint necessity case, because it would then 
seem that in addition to being individually unable to guarantee the success of the collective endeavor, 
each passerby is also not strictly speaking necessary for its success. I leave this problem aside here and 
will return to it later. 
 10  Consequently, in a case of collective omission, no one would be blameworthy for the failure to free 
him. Further, if individual contributory obligations are understood as conditional, we run into the 
problem of mutual release. Simultaneous non- action by all potential contributors voids obligations of 
the kind “I ought to help if the others do” (see Goodin 2011). 
 11  For a more detailed defence of this account, see Schwenkenbecher ( 2019 ). 
 12  An option for acting is ‘collectively available’ if it is an option for two or more agents acting (or produ-
cing an outcome) together, but not something an individual can do (or bring about). For instance, the 
option of getting married is not available to me as an individual. It is only available to me and another 
person together. 
 13  My notion of ‘we- reasoning’ is equivalent to what Hakli et al. ( 2010 ) called ‘we- mode reasoning.’ It 
diff ers from what Gold and Sugden ( 2007 ) and Sugden and Gold ( 2007 ) call ‘team- reasoning’ in that 
it is not a joint (or team) eff ort. 
 14  A more detailed account of the diff erence between I- mode reasoning and we- mode reasoning can be 
found in Schwenkenbecher ( 2019 ). 
 15  This is a payoff - matrix for a Hi- Lo game. We can easily imagine moral decision- making scenarios that 
have this structure. Even when each player is ignorant of the other player’s choice, it seems obvious that 
they should pick option A.
   Player 2   
   A  B  
 Player 1  A  Hi/ Hi  0/ 0  Hi > Lo > 0 
  B  0/ 0  Lo/ Lo  
 16  Joint ability is temporal and comes in degrees. 
 17  This requires at least that agents are able to conceive of a collective pattern of actions, which their own 
and other agents’ individual actions could form part of. It does not require them to believe that others 
are likely to perform their contributory actions within the pattern, only to think that they could con-
ceive of their individual actions as part of such a pattern. Stemplowska ( 2016 : 286) argues that if we 
have good reason to believe that other agents are not in a position where they can conceive of their 
individual contributory actions as forming part of such a collective pattern, then a collective action 
should be considered unfeasible:
 [A] n action of each of three billion people touching his or her nose next Tuesday is correctly 
classifi ed as unfeasible because there are not three billion people who could know next Tuesday 
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how to do it or that their individual contributions are needed. (Of course it remains open that 
this may become possible in future, in which case the action will become feasible then.) 
 (Stemplowska,  2016 ) 
 18  In a wide joint necessity case, the same clause applies. It must be possible for each to intentionally 
perform their contributory action, which may mean to refrain from contributing where their contri-
bution is either superfl uous or detrimental to the success of the joint endeavor. 
 19  I cannot go into the debate on collective intentions or ‘we- intentions’ here. Suffi  ce to say that plural 
intentions in the minimal sense are not interlocking intentions (of the kind that Michael Bratman 
(2014) focuses on), but ‘independent’ individual intentions. 
 20  A belief that  x obtains is  shared between two agents if each agent believes that  x obtains. It is a  common 
belief if it is shared  and if each agent knows that it is shared (fi rst order common belief). See also (Roy 
& Schwenkenbecher, under review). 
 21  This is what Scott Shapiro refers to as a ‘shared plan’ (Shapiro,  2014 ). 
 22  One might extend this period of blameless ignorance to the second half of the twentieth century. I am 
assuming that Svante Arrhenius’ discovery of the greenhouse eff ect towards the end of the nineteenth 
century was not public knowledge for a long time. However, at the very latest with the adoption of 
the UNFCCC in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, climate change and the greenhouse eff ects should have been 
widely known. 
 23  It should be noted, though, that Zimmerman is an individualist about moral obligations and would 
probably not subscribe to the idea of collective obligations defended here. 
 24  Bacharach ( 2006 ) and others (e.g. Butler et al., 2011) insist that we- reasoning involves what they call 
‘agency transformation.’ This means that individuals consider the group the locus of agency, rather than 
themselves (see also Woodard, 2011). 
 25  Another way to put this is to say that it depends on which moral reason(s) for action outweigh all 
others (see e.g. Woodard, 2011). 
 26  It should be noted that these conditions are jointly suffi  cient for collective obligations, but are not all 
necessary. This is because such obligations can also arise in the absence of joint necessity where one 
person alone can produce a morally optimal outcome or perform the corresponding action, but it is a 
matter of fairness that another agent (or other agents) help her in doing so. Cases of joint obligations 
arising from distributive justice rather than joint necessity are not discussed here. 
 27  Finally, whether or not a pro- tanto collective obligation becomes an all- out collective obligation 
depends on whether or not for the contributing agents there are competing overriding (collective or 
individual) duties. Or, to put it diff erently, it depends on whether or not the group- based reasons for 
contributing to the collective endeavor weigh heavier than other reasons (on group- based reasons for 
action see (Woodard,  2017 ). 
 28  This question is diff erent from that of ascribing duties to group agents such as states or international 
organizations. The question of duties of the global citizenry (if you like) or humanity arises not least, 
because those (group) agents whom we would consider principally responsible are failing in resolving 
problems such as climate change or global poverty. However, I do not claim that states’ and other pol-
itical agents’ failure to resolve these problems is the only or even the major source of joint obligations 
to address large- scale collective action problems. 
 29  The emissions gap is the gap between the level of emission reductions required for limiting global 
warming to maximally 2 ° C (with a high probability) and the emission reductions states have currently 
committed to (UNEP,  2017 ). 
 30  A fully- fl edged argument for this conclusion would need to specify who counts as ‘capable’ in this 
regard. My fi rst instinct would be to suggest that anyone who has the economic, intellectual, and epi-
stemic capacity to make such behavioral changes without incurring disproportionate costs. Obviously, 
this need not be tied to certain nationalities – it may well be that a rich person from Zambia is more 
‘capable’ in this sense than a poor person from the United States. 
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